News
A suspected China-nexus group used a vCenter login bypass before the patch.
Google and Mandiant say the espionage group Armory Castle used a vCenter authentication bypass as a zero-day in early September 2026, took an administrator session, and copied files. The fixes shipped on November 19.

Impact
- What was impacted
- VMware vCenter Server's VMware Directory Service, CVE-2026-123890, rated 9.8. Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant describe it as an unauthenticated disclosure of a Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key over DCE/RPC. Exploitation creates an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local, from which the attacker can run commands and copy files, including the data.mdb database, through the Directory Service (vmdird). Armory Castle, formerly UNC5221, used a Golang tool called BONESAW while the bug was still unpatched, to copy a Lightning Memory-Mapped Database, hijack the SAML Security Token Service, and create an SSO administrator. The same campaign used a then-unpatched BeyondTrust Remote Support flaw, CVE-2026-102764, rated 9.3, and a proxy tunneler called BARECLAW. Other tools: JSP web shells SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH, a SAML utility called SAWSNAKE, a Dropbear-based backdoor called BEARBONES listening on TCP port 33992, and a Go backdoor called LAZYBONES that takes commands from Slack.
- Who was impacted
- Operators of VMware vCenter, VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, Telco Cloud Platform, and Telco Cloud Infrastructure, including anyone whose vCenter was reachable on the internal network in early September 2026. Operators of BeyondTrust Remote Support, because the same campaign used CVE-2026-102764. Google describes Armory Castle as a suspected China-nexus espionage group.
- What you need to do
- Install the November 19, 2026 fixes. VMware Cloud Foundation and vSphere Foundation 9.1 are fixed in 9.1.1.0200, and the 9.0 line in 9.0.2.0200. vCenter 8.0 is fixed in 8.0 U3m. VMware Cloud Foundation is fixed in 5.2.5. Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure are fixed in vCenter 8.0 U3m for the lines this report lists as TCI 3.0, TCP 3.0, 4.x, 5.0.x, 5.1.x, and 5.2. vCenter 7.0 has no build number here: contact Broadcom Support if you are on an extended support contract. Then look for a local administrator of the form sps-<redacted>@vsphere.local, SSH turned on through the appliance management API, a listener on TCP 33992, and a new SSH key on the ESXi root account. If you run BeyondTrust Remote Support, apply the vendor fix for CVE-2026-102764. This report does not give that product's build number.
Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant say Armory Castle used CVE-2026-123890 in early September 2026, before the patch. Armory Castle is a suspected China-nexus espionage group formerly tracked as UNC5221. The flaw is an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service, rated 9.8. They describe it as an unauthenticated disclosure of a Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key over DCE/RPC. A successful exploit creates an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local. From that session the attacker can run commands and take files, including the data.mdb database, through the Directory Service process vmdird. Broadcom's fixes were released on November 19, 2026. This report names VMware Cloud Foundation and vSphere Foundation 9.1.1.0200 for the 9.1 line, 9.0.2.0200 for the 9.0 line, vCenter 8.0 U3m, and VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2.5. Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure are fixed in vCenter 8.0 U3m, for the lines listed as TCI 3.0, TCP 3.0, 4.x, 5.0.x, 5.1.x, and 5.2. For vCenter 7.0 it says to contact Broadcom Support if you have an extended support contract, and it names no build.
The group used a Golang utility called BONESAW. Google says it exploits CVE-2026-123890 remotely, copies out a Lightning Memory-Mapped Database, hijacks vCenter's SAML Security Token Service, and creates an SSO administrator account. Google suspects the group knew of the flaw before CVE-2026-59309 was disclosed on July 29, 2026. The evidence it cites is a recovered BONESAW binary whose build timestamp is July 13, 2026. The report also says build metadata can be changed before compilation, so the timestamp is not proof by itself. BONESAW, as described here, is aimed at CVE-2026-123890. This report does not say that CVE-2026-59309 and CVE-2026-123890 are the same identifier.
The vCenter activity was part of a wider intrusion. The group also exploited a then-unpatched BeyondTrust Remote Support flaw, CVE-2026-102764, rated 9.3, for reconnaissance, administrative control, and persistence, and it deployed a custom proxy tunneler called BARECLAW. From the Remote Support system they moved to an internal Linux appliance, became root, and used further tools to map the network, steal data, and reach the virtual machines. Google says they scanned for VMware ports 9080, 5480, and 2012. Port 2012 is the control interface for vCenter Single Sign-On, and Google says it was part of the remote use of this flaw through BONESAW. On the Linux appliance they left two JSP web shells, SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH, which run commands, stage payloads, and hold access.
After BONESAW, a Golang tool called SAWSNAKE can bypass vCenter SAML checks and mint a session cookie. Google says that supports a Golden SAML attack: forged authentication tokens, a bypass of multi-factor authentication, and impersonation of any user. SAWSNAKE is described as a Go port of a public Python script. A C backdoor called BEARBONES, based on the open-source Dropbear SSH server, can skip the system password check, record passwords in clear text, and load or create host keys from the temporary directory. Google says that after BEARBONES opened a listener on TCP port 33992, the group reached the vCenter appliance as Administrator, created a local administrator account of the form sps-<redacted>@vsphere.local, and turned SSH on through the vCenter Server Appliance Management Interface with a PUT request to /rest/appliance/access/ssh. They then connected over SSH with that new account.
In the last stage they listed files on ESXi, mounted VMFS volumes, and added an SSH public key to the root account. They archived data from the ESXi file system and downloaded it with HTTP GET requests to the Remote Support appliance, then sent it out from there. On a separate Linux appliance they left LAZYBONES, a small Go backdoor that polls a Slack channel for commands to run a program, transfer a file, or change how often it checks in. Google says LAZYBONES was also used in an early 2025 intrusion after exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure CVE-2025-22457, rated 9.0. CrowdStrike said late last month that the same group had used a separate VMware ESX logging weakness, CVE-2026-41709, rated 2.7, to shrink the audit trail. This report gives no patch number for that logging bug. Google says the three specialized toolsets and the two zero-days in this one campaign, the vCenter bug and the Remote Support bug, point to a well-resourced effort against high-priority targets. CVE-2026-123890 is the second VMware flaw Armory Castle has used as a zero-day this year, after the ESX logging bug.
For your AI agent
Agent instructions — copy paste to Claude
You are helping me respond to CVE-2026-123890, a vCenter authentication bypass that Google and Mandiant say Armory Castle exploited as a zero-day in early September 2026. Do not write or run an exploit, a proof of concept, or a login request that tries to skip authentication. Do not download or run BONESAW, SAWSNAKE, BEARBONES, BARECLAW, LAZYBONES, SLIMSAVAGE, CAGEMATCH, or the public Python script SAWSNAKE is based on. Ask before installing patches, deleting accounts, changing SSH, or isolating an appliance. Facts from the report: - CVE-2026-123890 is rated 9.8. Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant describe it as an unauthenticated Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key disclosure over DCE/RPC in the VMware Directory Service. Exploitation creates an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local. The attacker can then run commands and copy files, including data.mdb, through vmdird. - Armory Castle, formerly UNC5221, is described as a suspected China-nexus espionage group. Google says the group used the bug in early September 2026, before the November 19, 2026 patches, with a Golang tool called BONESAW. BONESAW copies a Lightning Memory-Mapped Database, hijacks the SAML Security Token Service, and creates an SSO administrator. - Google suspects the group knew of the flaw before CVE-2026-59309 was disclosed on July 29, 2026, because a recovered BONESAW binary has a build timestamp of July 13, 2026. Build metadata can be changed before compilation. This report identifies the bug BONESAW uses as CVE-2026-123890. Do not treat CVE-2026-59309 as another name for CVE-2026-123890 unless a vendor advisory in front of you says they are the same. - Fixed builds named here: VMware Cloud Foundation and vSphere Foundation 9.1.1.0200 for the 9.1 line; 9.0.2.0200 for the 9.0 line; vCenter 8.0 U3m; VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2.5. Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure are fixed in vCenter 8.0 U3m for the lines listed as TCI 3.0, TCP 3.0, 4.x, 5.0.x, 5.1.x, and 5.2. vCenter 7.0 has no build in this report. Contact Broadcom Support if an extended support contract is in place. Do not invent a 7.0 build. - This report does not discuss vCenter Quick Patch or install order. If a Broadcom advisory in front of you adds an install-order warning, follow that advisory. Do not invent one. - The same campaign exploited BeyondTrust Remote Support CVE-2026-102764, rated 9.3, while it was unpatched, and deployed a proxy tunneler called BARECLAW. This report does not name the fixed Remote Support build. Do not invent one. - They moved from Remote Support to an internal Linux appliance, became root, and scanned for ports 9080, 5480, and 2012. Port 2012 is the vCenter Single Sign-On control interface. Do not run that scan yourself. - SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH are JSP web shells on the Linux appliance. SAWSNAKE forges vCenter SAML sessions, which Google says can bypass multi-factor authentication and impersonate any user. BEARBONES is a Dropbear-based backdoor that listened on TCP port 33992, can skip the system password, and can record clear-text passwords. After that listener, they created a local administrator of the form sps-<redacted>@vsphere.local and enabled SSH with a PUT to /rest/appliance/access/ssh, then connected with the new account. - They mounted ESXi VMFS volumes, added an SSH public key for root, archived ESXi files, and pulled them to the Remote Support appliance with HTTP GET. LAZYBONES on a separate Linux appliance polls Slack for commands. Google says LAZYBONES was also used in early 2025 after Ivanti Connect Secure CVE-2025-22457, rated 9.0. - CrowdStrike said late last month that the group used VMware ESX CVE-2026-41709, rated 2.7, an insufficient-logging flaw, to shrink the audit trail. This report gives no patch number for it. The two zero-days in this campaign are CVE-2026-123890 and CVE-2026-102764. Context: - What was impacted: vCenter authentication through the Directory Service, plus BeyondTrust Remote Support in the same campaign, and ESXi files after the attackers were already in. - Who should care: operators of vCenter and the named VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, and Telco products, and operators of BeyondTrust Remote Support. - What to do: install the named vCenter fix, contact Broadcom for vCenter 7.0 on extended support, apply the vendor fix for CVE-2026-102764 if you run Remote Support, and hunt for the account, SSH, and listener indicators. Do this in order. Ask before patching, deleting an account, disabling SSH, or isolating an appliance. Prefer read-only inventory first. Do not write or run an exploit or a proof of concept. 1. Inventory - List vCenter, VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, Telco Cloud Platform, and Telco Cloud Infrastructure instances. Record the version. Flag anything below the fixed build named above for that line. For 7.0, record only whether an extended support contract exists. Do not invent a build. - Record whether BeyondTrust Remote Support is present. Note CVE-2026-102764. If a vendor advisory in front of you names a fixed build, record it. If it does not, say this report did not name one. - Look for local accounts matching sps- at vsphere.local, unexpected SSO administrators, and SSH enabled on vCenter. Search logs for a PUT to /rest/appliance/access/ssh around or after early September 2026. Do not send that request. - Look for a listener on TCP 33992, an SSH public key added to ESXi root, JSP web shells on Linux appliances tied to vCenter or Remote Support, and unexpected access to data.mdb. Do not open the database beyond a read-only check the operator already allows. 2. Contain - If an unexpected sps- administrator, a new ESXi root key, or BEARBONES on port 33992 is present, propose isolating that appliance from the rest of the network and disabling the unexpected SSH access. Ask before changing it. State that isolation is containment, not the vendor patch. - Propose taking BeyondTrust Remote Support offline from untrusted networks if it is unpatched for CVE-2026-102764. Ask before changing access. This report does not list a workaround. 3. Remediate - Plan the November 19 fix for the branch you run: 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200, 8.0 U3m, or VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2.5, or vCenter 8.0 U3m for the Telco lines named above. Ask before installing. If a Broadcom advisory in front of you warns about install order, follow that warning. - For vCenter 7.0 on extended support, plan a request to Broadcom Support. Do not pick a build number yourself. - For BeyondTrust Remote Support, plan the vendor fix for CVE-2026-102764 once you have the vendor's build number. Do not invent it. - This report gives no patch number for ESX CVE-2026-41709. Say so. Do not invent a build. 4. Verify - Confirm the running vCenter build matches the fixed build you intended. - Confirm any unexpected administrator account or root SSH key is still present or has been removed only if you were asked to remove it. - Confirm Remote Support is on the vendor fix only if you applied one. 5. Report back - Versions found, whether any sps- account, unexpected SSH, port 33992 listener, or ESXi root key showed up, whether Remote Support is in the environment, and what you changed. Say which items still have no build number in this report. Do not invent CVEs, build numbers, or exploit conditions. If a check needs access I have not given you, say what you need and stop.