News
Bazuka hides Android theft behind a fake copy of the home screen.
Researchers described Bazuka, an Android malware framework that covers its activity with a screenshot of the home screen or lock screen. One dropper pretends to be a premium TikTok app and can be spread through Google Play.

Impact
- What was impacted
- Bazuka, an Android malware framework ThreatFabric found in late October 2026 while investigating an NFC-relay banking trojan. It is a dropper or downloader, a core, and 23 modules for overlays, keylogging, SMS and one-time-code theft, remote control, and swapping a copied cryptocurrency address. A dropper uses the package name com.tiktok.premium and can download a stager named com.tiktok.premium.pro. The same report also describes ArcticRAT, a separate Android remote-access trojan with 129 commands that uses a language model on stolen texts and can black out the screen while an operator uses the phone.
- Who was impacted
- Android users who install a premium TikTok or another app from a social ad, a fake store page, or a prompt to allow installs from outside the store, and organizations whose phones allow that. ArcticRAT, in the same report, sends people to sites that imitate Google Play listings for brands such as Amazon and TikTok, cryptocurrency apps, and file managers, via ads, text messages, or forums. Bazuka is not attributed to a named group. Its control panel mixes English and Russian.
- What you need to do
- Do not install a TikTok premium app, and do not approve installs from unknown sources for a chat or an ad. On phones you manage, review the package names com.tiktok.premium and com.tiktok.premium.pro. If the home screen or lock screen does not respond, if Developer options or Wireless debugging turned on by themselves, or if an unknown app holds Accessibility, stop using that phone for banking, passwords, and one-time codes. Do not assume uninstall finished the job: Bazuka can block uninstall and force-stop, and it can wipe its own local data. This report names no CVE and no removal tool.
ThreatFabric, a Dutch mobile-security company, described a previously unknown Android malware framework called Bazuka. Researchers found it in late October 2026 during an investigation into an NFC-relay banking trojan. They call it a full framework: a dropper or downloader, a core, and 23 modules. Those modules cover screen overlays, keylogging, intercepting SMS and one-time codes, remote control, and replacing a cryptocurrency address that was copied to the clipboard. The operators' panel can use a language model, running locally or through an API, to help decide which infected phones deserve attention. One sample prompt refers to a score, so an operator can ask the model to rank victims. The panel can also create accounts for traffers, the people who push victims toward the malware, and build droppers whose permission lists are chosen in a way the researchers say is likely meant to get past Google Play's app review.
That indicates two ways the apps spread: traffers using social ads or bogus sites, and the Play Store. One dropper pretends to be a premium, adult-oriented TikTok and uses the package name com.tiktok.premium. ThreatFabric saw two chains. In one, the dropper asks for permission to install apps from outside the store, then downloads a separate package, com.tiktok.premium.pro, that acts as a stager. In the other, a downloader fetches the main payload directly. The researchers suspect the stager and the downloader are the same program. It fetches the core and the modules a campaign needs, then starts them.
Once those pieces are loaded, Bazuka watches text the person types and puts up an overlay when that helps the operator. The overlay is a screenshot of the home screen or the lock screen, shown on demand so activity behind it stays hidden. Commands come from a server over two WebSocket channels, one for commands and one for stolen data and captured screens. The core uses Android's accessibility service and Android Debug Bridge commands to request permissions and grant them itself. It can open system settings, turn on Developer options, turn on Wireless debugging, and take the pairing PIN so it can connect to that debugging service. It can also turn off Google Play's protection component through accessibility. A self-destruct clears local storage, deletes its database, and disables the app, and another module tries to block uninstall and force-stop. The panel's interface mixes English and Russian. ThreatFabric has not attributed Bazuka to a known group. It says extra modules that keep running after the host app is removed are not part of Bazuka's current design, though that pattern is appearing in other banking trojans.
The same report describes a second Android family, ArcticRAT, from Zimperium's zLabs team. Researchers Rajat Goyal and Fernando Ortega say it began as spyware aimed at people who use 11 specific cryptocurrency apps and now has 129 commands. Victims are sent, through ads, text messages, or forums, to sites that imitate Google Play listings. The apps impersonate brands such as Amazon and TikTok, cryptocurrency apps, and file managers. After install it uses accessibility for remote control, talks to its server over TCP, and runs stolen SMS and the list of installed apps through a language model looking for banking and trading. It can show a fake extortion screen that asks for cryptocurrency. It can also draw a black overlay and drop the brightness to zero so the phone looks off while an operator uses it. Newer builds turn on Wireless debugging as well. It asks for a VPN service so it can cut the phone's network off during setup, which Zimperium says blinds Google Play Protect telemetry.
This report names no CVE and no app version to patch, because these are malicious apps rather than a flaw in a product you update. Do not install a premium TikTok, and do not let a message or an ad turn on installs from unknown sources. If a phone already has com.tiktok.premium or com.tiktok.premium.pro, or an unrecognized app holds Accessibility, or Developer options and Wireless debugging are on and nobody turned them on, stop using that phone for banking, passwords, and one-time codes. Uninstall may not finish the job. Bazuka includes a module meant to block uninstall and force-stop, and it can wipe its own data. Have the phone checked before trusting it again.
For your AI agent
Agent instructions — copy paste to Claude
You are helping me respond to the Android malware framework Bazuka, and to ArcticRAT, which the same report describes. Do not write or run malware, a dropper, an overlay, or a proof of concept. Do not enable Developer options, Wireless debugging, or Accessibility to test this. Do not pair ADB, capture a screen, or send a USSD request. Ask before uninstalling apps, changing device settings, or wiping a phone. Facts from the report: - ThreatFabric found Bazuka in late October 2026 while investigating an NFC-relay banking trojan. Do not say Bazuka is that trojan. The report does not say that. - Bazuka is a dropper or downloader, a core, and 23 modules covering overlays, keylogging, SMS and one-time-code interception, remote control, and cryptocurrency-address swapping on the clipboard. Do not reconstruct the modules or their commands. - Operators get a control panel that can call a language model, local or through an API, to pick victims of interest. One sample prompt refers to a score. The panel can create accounts for traffers and build droppers with chosen Android permissions, which the researchers say is likely an attempt to get past Google Play review. Do not build a dropper. - Distribution indicated by the researchers: traffers using social ads or bogus sites, and Google Play. One dropper masquerades as a premium, adult-friendly TikTok with package name com.tiktok.premium. One chain asks the victim to allow installs from third-party sources, then downloads com.tiktok.premium.pro as a stager. Another chain is a downloader that fetches the main payload directly. The researchers suspect the stager and the downloader are the same program. Do not invent a Play Store URL. The report does not give one. - After the core loads, Bazuka is a keylogger and an overlay trojan. The overlay is a screenshot of the home screen or lock screen, shown on demand to hide background activity. The server uses two WebSocket channels: one for commands, one for stolen data and screen-capture streams. - The core abuses accessibility services and ADB shell commands to request permissions and grant them. It can open settings, enable Developer options, enable Wireless debugging, and intercept the pairing PIN to open a TLS connection to the ADB daemon. It can disable Google Play's protection component through accessibility. It has a self-destruct that clears local storage, deletes the database, and disables the app, and an uninstall-shield module that counters uninstall or force-stop. Do not turn those settings on. Do not claim that removing the app is always enough, and do not claim modules survive uninstall: ThreatFabric says that surviving-module design is not there yet for Bazuka. - Bazuka is not attributed to a known group. The panel mixes English and Russian. Do not invent an attribution. - ArcticRAT, described in the same report by Zimperium zLabs researchers Rajat Goyal and Fernando Ortega, started as spyware aimed at users of 11 specific cryptocurrency apps and now supports 129 commands. Lures are sites impersonating Google Play listings, reached by malvertising, smishing, or third-party forums. Apps masquerade as brands such as Amazon and TikTok, cryptocurrency apps, and file managers. It uses accessibility, TCP to its server, and a language model to parse stolen SMS and app data for financial, banking, and trading signals. It can show fake extortion overlays demanding cryptocurrency, capture the lock screen pattern, PIN, or password, request VPN privileges to null-route the network and blind Google Play Protect telemetry during staging, and cover the screen with a black undismissible view while brightness drops to zero. Recent versions also abuse Wireless debugging. Do not name the 11 crypto apps. The report's summary does not list them. Do not invent a package name for ArcticRAT. None is given. - This report names no CVE for either family and no removal tool. Do not invent one. Context: - What was impacted: Android phones that installed Bazuka, and phones that installed ArcticRAT as described in the same report. - Who should care: Android users and anyone who manages Android phones, especially if sideloading or installs from ads are allowed. - What to do: do not install the fake apps, look for the two Bazuka package names and for unexpected Accessibility, Developer options, or Wireless debugging, and treat a matching phone as untrusted until a person reviews it. Do this in order. Ask before uninstalling, changing settings, or wiping a device. Prefer read-only inventory first. Do not write or run an exploit or a proof of concept. 1. Inventory - On phones I administer, list installed packages only if I have already given you a read-only way to do that. Flag com.tiktok.premium and com.tiktok.premium.pro. Do not install anything to perform the check. - Record whether Accessibility is granted to an app the operator does not recognize, and whether Developer options or Wireless debugging are on. If you cannot tell who turned them on, say so. - Do not hunt ArcticRAT by a package name. This report does not give one. Note only the lure pattern: a store page reached from an ad, a text, or a forum, for a brand the phone did not install from the real store. 2. Contain - If a flag matches, say to stop entering banking details, passwords, and one-time codes on that phone. Ask before disconnecting an account or wiping the device. - Do not disable Play Protect, and do not enable Wireless debugging. Those are things the malware does. 3. Remediate - There is no vendor patch in this report. Do not propose an Android version upgrade as the fix. - Propose removal only as a plan a person confirms. Say that Bazuka can block uninstall and force-stop and can wipe its own local data, and that the report does not give a cleanup procedure. Ask before a factory reset. Do not invent a scanner signature. 4. Verify - After a change I asked you to perform, check the same package names and the same settings again. - If I did not ask you to change anything, report the inventory only. 5. Report back - Which phones you could see, whether either Bazuka package was present, whether Accessibility, Developer options, or Wireless debugging looked unexpected, what you changed, and what is still untrusted. Do not invent CVEs, package names, or signs of a past intrusion beyond the facts above. If a check needs access I have not given you, say what you need and stop.