SAASMENT

News

Cold Relic turned one Google Workspace breach into a second U.S. compromise.

Russia-linked Cold Relic used stolen Workspace data and staff directories to phish a second organization through trusted contacts.

Illustration of a compromised cloud identity path chaining from one organization to another

Impact

What was impacted
Google Workspace and related cloud identity: Super Admin abuse, rogue MFA devices and passkeys, mass Drive and Takeout exfiltration, then follow-on phishing into Microsoft Entra ID SSO.
Who was impacted
U.S. organizations — and their partners — in the same professional networks as prior Cold Relic victims. High-value targets have included government, defense, and NGO environments in Europe and North America.
What you need to do
Lock down Super Admin and MFA enrollment, revoke unknown devices/passkeys/backup codes, review Alert Center and admin audit logs for deletions, watch for partners impersonating staff after a breach, and treat shared “document” links from known contacts as credential phishing until proven otherwise.

Google’s Mandiant and Threat Intelligence Group described a 2026 intrusion where Cold Relic (also known as COLDRIVER / UNC4057) reused data from a late-2025 compromise at one U.S. organization to break into another.

In the first tenant, the group combined stolen Super Admin credentials with MFA fatigue, then registered its own MFA device, passkeys, and backup codes for lasting access. From there it pulled Drive contents, checked and wiped Alert Center evidence, and exported staff lists and domain data through Google Takeout.

After eviction, Cold Relic kept impersonating employees to phish people in the same professional circles. Against a second U.S. organization that used Entra ID as SSO for Google Workspace, it posed as a known contact on a secure messaging app, shared a fake technical document link, stole Entra credentials and tokens, and enrolled a new MFA device to hold access while downloading cloud files.

The lesson is chained trust: one cloud compromise supplies authentic pretexts against every partner who still believes the stolen names and mailboxes.

For your AI agent

Agent instructions — copy paste to Claude

You are helping me harden against Cold Relic-style cloud identity abuse (also tracked as COLDRIVER / UNC4057): Super Admin / MFA fatigue, rogue MFA devices and passkeys, Workspace data theft, then partner phishing into Entra ID SSO.

Context:
- What was impacted: Google Workspace admin abuse, MFA/passkey persistence, Drive/Takeout exfil, follow-on Entra ID phishing.
- Who should care: orgs on Google Workspace and/or Entra-federated Workspace, plus partners who trust our staff identities.
- Goal: detect persistence, cut attacker MFA/passkeys, and reduce partner-impersonation risk.

Do this in order. Ask before changing production settings. Prefer audit/read steps first.

1. Identity persistence review (Google Workspace)
   - List Super Admins and recent admin privilege changes.
   - Inventory enrolled MFA devices, passkeys, and backup codes for admins and high-value users; flag unknowns.
   - Check Alert Center and admin audit logs for deletions, mass sharing, Takeout exports, and OAuth grants to unfamiliar clients.
2. Contain
   - Revoke unknown devices/passkeys/sessions for impacted accounts.
   - Require re-enrollment of MFA with phishing-resistant methods where available.
   - Restrict or monitor Super Admin usage and Takeout / domain-wide data export.
3. Partner / SSO path
   - If we use Entra ID as SSO into Workspace (or the reverse), review new MFA devices and risky sign-ins on the IdP.
   - Draft guidance for staff: treat unexpected “document” links from known contacts as phishing until verified out-of-band.
4. Monitoring
   - Propose alert rules for Alert Center wipe activity, mass Drive sharing, new admin MFA enrollment, and Takeout jobs.
5. Report back
   - Findings, actions taken, residual risk, and a short checklist for our IT owner.

Do not run social-engineering simulations against real partners without explicit approval.

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