SAASMENT

News

A person holding a locked Windows PC can start programs without signing in.

A technique called FastUnlock lets someone with a locked Windows computer in their hands start programs without a password, and only in a limited account. Microsoft has not published a fix.

Illustration of a charcoal laptop lock screen with a lime padlock and a small window leaving through a pink opening

Impact

What was impacted
Windows lock screens, through a technique called FastUnlock. It needs the computer in someone's hands, a Microsoft account that can be reached from the lock screen's recovery options, and the built-in screen reader Narrator. In a test by ThreatLocker, a program started from the lock screen in a limited account the firm identified as WSIAccount and described as not an administrator account. FastUnlock does not break BitLocker or recover the encryption key. On machines whose TPM unlocks the drive at startup with no PIN, the files are already readable by the time the lock screen appears, which is when this technique runs. No official list of affected Windows versions has been published, and the report names no CVE.
Who was impacted
People and organizations whose Windows computers can be physically reached, including laptops, shared desks, and front-counter machines. Sensitive machines that use BitLocker with TPM auto-unlock and no startup PIN are in the same situation once the lock screen is showing. Until Microsoft publishes a version list, treat any Windows computer that meets those conditions as possibly affected.
What you need to do
There is no Microsoft patch yet, and the report does not show this method in a real attack. Keep laptops, shared desks, and front-counter computers out of a stranger's hands. On sensitive machines, add a BitLocker startup PIN instead of letting the drive unlock by itself. Shut down or hibernate a device when it leaves someone's control: a startup PIN only helps a machine that has not started yet, not one already sitting on the lock screen. Do not treat a locked screen by itself as enough. Microsoft's hands-on-attacker guidance recommends a startup PIN plus shutdown or hibernate. Apply an official fix when one appears.

A researcher who uses the handles MSNightmare and Nightmare Eclipse posted FastUnlock the day before this November 20 report, as a short note with a video and little written explanation. ThreatLocker tested it the same day and found that it works. Microsoft has not issued a fix, and the report says nothing shows the method has been used in a real attack.

The technique is not universal. The person needs the computer in their hands, a Microsoft account that the lock screen's recovery options can reach, and Narrator to move around the locked screen. ThreatLocker's test got as far as starting a program from the lock screen in a limited account the firm identified as WSIAccount, which it said is not an administrator account.

BitLocker does not, by itself, stop this on a common setup. A TPM can unlock the drive when the computer starts, with no PIN, which Microsoft's TPM documentation describes. By the time the lock screen is up, the files are already readable, and FastUnlock runs then. It does not break the encryption or take the key. It uses a computer that has already unlocked its drive the normal way. That is a smaller problem than cracking an encrypted disk, and it is still a problem for a machine someone else is holding.

No official list of affected Windows versions has been published. Until one exists, treat a machine as possibly affected when someone can reach it and a Microsoft account is available from the lock screen recovery options. With no patch, the useful steps are physical control and startup protection: lock away or closely manage laptops, shared desks, and front-counter computers; add a BitLocker startup PIN on sensitive machines; shut down or hibernate devices when they leave someone's control. A startup PIN does not protect a machine that is already on the lock screen. Microsoft's countermeasures guidance for determined hands-on attackers recommends a startup PIN together with shutdown or hibernate. Watch for an official fix or advisory and apply it when it appears.

For your AI agent

Agent instructions — copy paste to Claude

You are helping me respond to FastUnlock, an unpatched technique that can start programs from a locked Windows screen. Do not write or run an exploit, a proof of concept, or lock-screen navigation steps. Do not open the researcher's disclosure video, reconstruct how Narrator is used, or try the technique on any machine, including one I own.

Facts from the report:
- FastUnlock was posted the day before the November 20, 2026 report by a researcher who uses the handles MSNightmare and Nightmare Eclipse. The disclosure is a short note with a video and little written detail. ThreatLocker tested it the same day and found that it works.
- Someone with the computer in their hands can start programs without signing in. The result is a limited account, not administrator control. In ThreatLocker's test the account was identified as WSIAccount, which the firm said is not an administrator account. Do not assume the technique yields administrator or SYSTEM rights.
- It does not work on every machine. It requires physical access and a Microsoft account that can be reached through the lock screen's recovery options, and it uses the built-in screen reader Narrator. Do not invent other requirements.
- There is no fix from Microsoft yet. The report does not show the method in a real attack. No CVE is named. Do not invent one. No official list of affected Windows versions has been published. Treat a machine as possibly affected when it meets the conditions above, until Microsoft says otherwise.
- FastUnlock does not break BitLocker or recover the encryption key. On a common setup, a TPM unlocks the drive at startup without a PIN, which Microsoft's TPM documentation describes. By the time the lock screen appears, the files are already readable, and the technique runs at that point.
- With no patch, the report's steps are physical control and startup protection. Keep laptops, shared desks, and front-counter computers that a stranger could reach locked away or closely managed. On sensitive machines, add a BitLocker startup PIN instead of letting the drive unlock on its own. Shut down or hibernate devices when they leave someone's control. A startup PIN protects only a machine that has not yet started, not one already on the lock screen. Do not treat a locked screen on its own as enough.
- Microsoft's countermeasures guidance recommends a startup PIN, along with shutting down or hibernating machines, when facing determined hands-on attackers. Apply an official fix or advisory when one appears. Do not invent a registry key, a feature flag, or a Windows update as the fix.

Context:
- What was impacted: the Windows lock screen on machines someone can physically reach, when a Microsoft account is available from the lock screen recovery options.
- Who should care: operators of laptops, shared desks, and front-counter Windows computers, including sensitive machines that unlock BitLocker with a TPM and no startup PIN.
- What to do: control physical access, add a BitLocker startup PIN on sensitive machines, shut down or hibernate devices that leave someone's control, and wait for an official Microsoft fix.

Do this in order. Ask before changing BitLocker, shutdown policy, or device-management settings. Prefer read-only inventory first. Do not write or run an exploit or a proof of concept.

1. Inventory
   - List Windows computers that a stranger or untrusted person could physically reach, including laptops, shared desks, and front-counter machines. Record whether each one is a laptop that leaves the building.
   - For each, record whether BitLocker is on and whether the drive unlocks with a TPM alone or also requires a startup PIN. If you cannot tell, say so. Do not treat the absence of a PIN as proof the machine is vulnerable, and do not treat BitLocker as proof it is safe.
   - Record whether a Microsoft account can be reached from the lock screen recovery options, if that can be checked without attempting the technique. If you cannot check it safely, say so and stop that check.
   - Do not look up or test a Windows version against this technique. No affected-version list has been published.
2. Contain
   - Propose keeping reachable machines in controlled hands: locked storage or closer supervision for laptops, shared desks, and front-counter computers. Ask before changing a physical-security or device policy.
   - For sensitive machines that unlock BitLocker with a TPM and no PIN, propose adding a startup PIN. Ask before changing BitLocker protectors. State that the PIN does not protect a machine that is already powered on at the lock screen.
   - Propose shutting down or hibernating devices when they leave someone's control. Ask before changing power policy. Sleep is not the step named in this report.
3. Remediate
   - There is no Microsoft patch to install. Do not suggest a cumulative update, a build number, or a workaround key as if Microsoft had published one.
   - Plan the startup PIN and the shutdown-or-hibernate habit for the machines you flagged. Ask before applying either.
   - Watch for an official Microsoft fix or advisory. When one appears, summarize it and ask before installing it.
4. Verify
   - Confirm which machines now require a startup PIN, which ones are shut down or hibernated when they leave control, and which reachable machines are still only protected by the lock screen.
5. Report back
   - Machines in reach, BitLocker unlock mode where you could see it, what you changed, and what is still waiting on a Microsoft fix. Say that no CVE and no affected-version list were in this report.

Do not invent CVEs, Windows versions, account privileges, or exploit conditions. If a check needs access I have not given you, say what you need and stop.

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