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A 10-year-old NGINX HTTP/2 flaw can run code without a login.
Open-source NGINX from 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 can let someone who is not logged in run code as a worker when HTTP/2 is on. Fixed builds shipped on 18 November 2026, and the vendor and the labs that tested it have not reported attacks in the wild.

Impact
- What was impacted
- NGINX open source 1.9.5 through 1.31.8, and NGINX Plus 37.x before the fixed builds plus R34 through R36. CVE-2026-123007 (CVSS 4.0 score 9.2) is in HTTP/2 handling and has been in the open-source code since 1.9.5, released 22 September 2015. Code runs as the NGINX worker. F5 says that requires ASLR to be off or bypassed. In tests, Wiz bypassed ASLR on official 1.31.7 and 1.31.8 builds over TLS on 64-bit systems, and Xint reached code execution from a reachable HTTP/2 port, then root through a separate Linux kernel SCTP bug, including from Docker. Four related flaws, each also scored 9.2, can lead to code execution under the same ASLR condition only in a specific setup: CVE-2026-123633 (HTTP/2 while proxying and low on worker_connections), CVE-2026-123634 (a proxied server name built from variables, plus a server-side include or a mirror subrequest), CVE-2026-121810 (HTTP/3 on), and CVE-2026-113425 (NGINX as a mail proxy).
- Who was impacted
- Operators of those NGINX versions with HTTP/2 enabled (a listen directive that includes http2, or http2 on), and anyone using HTTP/3 or the mail proxy for the related bugs. Ubuntu 16.04 through 26.10 and Debian bookworm, trixie, forky, and sid had not shipped fixed nginx packages as of 18 November 2026. F5, Wiz, and Rapid7 have not reported attacks on CVE-2026-123007, and CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog did not list it as of that day.
- What you need to do
- Move open source 1.31.0–1.31.8 to 1.31.9, and 1.9.5–1.30.6 (including 1.28) to 1.30.7. Those two releases fix all five flaws. Move NGINX Plus 37.1.0–37.2.0.1 to 37.3.0.1, and 37.0.0–37.0.7.1 to 37.0.8.1. Those Plus builds fix four of the flaws; the CVE-2026-123633 fix was already in 37.2.0.1 and 37.0.7.1. No Plus fix is listed for R34–R36. Restart NGINX fully or use a live binary upgrade. A reload leaves the old executable and old workers in place. Official Docker images, including Alpine, had 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 tags that day. On a distribution package, match the distro advisory: a fix can ship without changing the version nginx -v prints. Until you can upgrade, turning HTTP/2 off blocks only CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633. On 1.25.1 and later, set http2 off in each affected server and remove http2 from listen. On 1.9.5 through 1.25.0, remove http2 from listen (listen 443 ssl http2; becomes listen 443 ssl;). Restart, then confirm with openssl s_client -alpn h2 against the origin, not only a CDN. Turning HTTP/3 off removes the setup CVE-2026-121810 needs. For CVE-2026-123634, avoid SSI and mirror directives and do not build a proxied server name from variables. For CVE-2026-113425, limit mail listeners to trusted networks. Hosts that do not use SCTP can add install sctp /bin/false to a file in /etc/modprobe.d until the kernel bug is fixed. That does not unload a module already loaded or built into the kernel.
F5 says a flaw in NGINX’s HTTP/2 support, CVE-2026-123007, can let an attacker run code without logging in. It has been in the open-source tree since version 1.9.5, released on 22 September 2015. Researchers refer to it as nginx2root. Fixed open-source versions 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 shipped on 18 November 2026. Code that lands this way runs as the NGINX worker. Reaching root on the host takes a second bug. In Xint’s tests, a separate flaw in the Linux kernel’s SCTP code provided that step, including when NGINX ran in Docker. F5 says code execution requires ASLR to be off or bypassed. Wiz tested official 1.31.7 and 1.31.8 builds over TLS on 64-bit systems and said it bypassed ASLR. Xint said a reachable HTTP/2 port was enough on its test servers, including public addresses on AWS, GCP, and Azure.
F5, Wiz, and Rapid7 have not reported attacks so far, and CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog did not list the flaw as of 18 November 2026. A public proof of concept exists; its notes say it is only for showing the issue against a freshly started Docker container on the same machine. Every open-source release from 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 is vulnerable, including 1.31.8 from 21 October 2026 and the 14 October security releases 1.31.7 and 1.30.6. NGINX Plus is affected in 37.x before the fixed builds and in R34 through R36. The same releases also fix four more flaws that F5 says can lead to code execution under the same ASLR condition. All five are scored 9.2 on CVSS 4.0. CVE-2026-123633 needs HTTP/2 while the worker is low on worker_connections and is passing requests to a backend. CVE-2026-123634 needs a proxied server name built from variables, plus a server-side include or a mirror subrequest that looks up the same name. CVE-2026-121810 needs HTTP/3. CVE-2026-113425 needs NGINX configured as a mail proxy.
Open source 1.31.0 through 1.31.8 is fixed in 1.31.9, and 1.9.5 through 1.30.6, including older branches such as 1.28, is fixed in 1.30.7. Those two versions fix all five flaws. NGINX Plus 37.1.0 through 37.2.0.1 is fixed in 37.3.0.1, and 37.0.0 through 37.0.7.1 is fixed in 37.0.8.1. Those Plus builds fix four of the flaws. The fix for CVE-2026-123633 was already in 37.2.0.1 and 37.0.7.1. No fix is listed for Plus R34 through R36. After upgrading, restart NGINX fully or use its live binary upgrade. A reload leaves the old executable running, and existing connections can stay on old workers. Official Docker images, including Alpine, had 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 tags as of 18 November 2026. Ubuntu and Debian had not shipped fixed packages that day. Ubuntu listed nginx as vulnerable from 16.04 through 26.10. Debian listed it as vulnerable in bookworm, trixie, forky, and sid. A distribution package can carry a fix without changing the version nginx -v prints, so compare the package with the distribution’s own advisory.
F5 lists workarounds for only two of the five flaws. For CVE-2026-123634, avoid SSI and mirror directives, and do not build a proxied server name from variables. For CVE-2026-113425, limit listeners to trusted networks. CIRCL, the Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg, says turning HTTP/2 off is a temporary mitigation until you upgrade. That blocks CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633, and leaves the other three in place. Turning HTTP/3 off removes the setup CVE-2026-121810 needs. HTTP/2 is on when a listen directive includes http2, or when http2 on is set. On 1.25.1 and later, set http2 off in each affected server block and remove http2 from its listen directives. On 1.9.5 through 1.25.0, remove http2 from the listen line, so listen 443 ssl http2; becomes listen 443 ssl;. Restart where needed, then run openssl s_client with -alpn h2. The output reads ALPN protocol: h2 if the server still accepts HTTP/2. Test the NGINX origin itself when a CDN sits in front, because an origin that speaks only HTTP/1.1 cannot be reached through HTTP/2. Until the kernel SCTP bug is fixed, hosts that do not use SCTP can add the line install sctp /bin/false to a .conf file in /etc/modprobe.d/. That does not unload a module that is already loaded or built into the kernel. CIRCL’s signs to look for are workers that start unexpected programs, workers that exit abnormally or leave core dumps, long-lived HTTP/2 connections with heavy incoming traffic but few logged requests, and unusual outbound connections or DNS lookups. A clean access log does not rule an attack out, because HTTP/2 control frames do not normally appear there as requests. None of those signs is proof on its own.
For your AI agent
Agent instructions — copy paste to Claude
You are helping me respond to CVE-2026-123007 (CVSS 4.0 score 9.2) in NGINX HTTP/2, present in open source 1.9.5 (22 September 2015) through 1.31.8. An unauthenticated attacker can run code as the NGINX worker when HTTP/2 is enabled. F5 says that requires ASLR off or bypassed. Wiz bypassed ASLR in tests on official 1.31.7 and 1.31.8 builds (HTTP/2 over TLS, 64-bit). Xint reported code execution from a reachable HTTP/2 port, including on public cloud addresses, and root via a separate Linux kernel SCTP bug even from Docker. Root is not automatic. F5, Wiz, and Rapid7 have not reported in-the-wild attacks. CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog did not list it as of 18 November 2026. A public proof of concept exists and its notes limit it to a local freshly started container. Do not download or run it. Four related flaws, each scored 9.2, can also lead to code execution under the same ASLR condition, only in a specific setup: - CVE-2026-123633: HTTP/2, proxying to a backend, worker low on worker_connections - CVE-2026-123634: proxied server name built from variables, plus SSI or a mirror subrequest - CVE-2026-121810: HTTP/3 on - CVE-2026-113425: NGINX as a mail proxy Fixed builds: - Open source 1.31.0–1.31.8 to 1.31.9 (fixes all five) - Open source 1.9.5–1.30.6, including 1.28, to 1.30.7 (fixes all five) - NGINX Plus 37.1.0–37.2.0.1 to 37.3.0.1 (fixes four; CVE-2026-123633 was already fixed in 37.2.0.1) - NGINX Plus 37.0.0–37.0.7.1 to 37.0.8.1 (fixes four; CVE-2026-123633 was already fixed in 37.0.7.1) - NGINX Plus R34–R36: no fix listed Official Docker tags 1.31.9 and 1.30.7, including Alpine, were available on 18 November 2026. Ubuntu 16.04–26.10 and Debian bookworm, trixie, forky, and sid had not shipped fixed packages that day. A distro package can be fixed without changing the version from nginx -v. Context: - What was impacted: NGINX worker processes on vulnerable open source and Plus builds when HTTP/2 is enabled, and, for the related bugs, when HTTP/3 or the mail proxy is in the vulnerable configuration. - Who should care: anyone running those versions, including origins behind a CDN. - What to do: upgrade and fully restart or live-upgrade the binary. A reload leaves the old executable running. Use the partial mitigations only until the upgrade. Do this in order. Ask before editing nginx.conf, restarting NGINX, changing firewall rules, or writing modprobe config. Prefer read-only inventory first. Do not write or run an exploit, a proof of concept, or HTTP/2 attack traffic. 1. Inventory - Record nginx -v and, on packaged installs, the distro package version. Flag open source 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 and Plus 37.x before 37.3.0.1 or 37.0.8.1, plus R34–R36. - Find server blocks with http2 on a listen directive or http2 on, any HTTP/3, and mail proxy listeners. - If a CDN is in front, check the origin, not only the CDN hostname. 2. Contain - If you cannot upgrade today, propose turning HTTP/2 off. On 1.25.1 and later, set http2 off in each affected server and remove http2 from listen. On 1.9.5 through 1.25.0, remove http2 from listen so listen 443 ssl http2; becomes listen 443 ssl;. That blocks CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 only. - Propose turning HTTP/3 off where CVE-2026-121810 applies, avoiding SSI and mirror and variable-built proxied server names for CVE-2026-123634, and limiting mail listeners to trusted networks for CVE-2026-113425. - On hosts that do not use SCTP, propose adding the line install sctp /bin/false under /etc/modprobe.d. That does not unload a module already loaded or built in. Ask before applying any of these. 3. Remediate - Plan the upgrade to 1.31.9 or 1.30.7, or the Plus builds above, including image rebuilds for Docker. Ask before the restart or live binary upgrade. Do not treat nginx -s reload as the fix. - On Ubuntu or Debian, use the distro package once it exists and compare it to that distro’s advisory. - For Plus R34–R36, no fix was listed. Ask how to move off those releases. 4. Verify - Confirm the running binary is the fixed build, or the distro package named in the advisory, and that old workers are gone. - Re-run openssl s_client -alpn h2 against the origin only as a check of whether HTTP/2 is still offered. Do not send attack traffic. 5. Hunt - Look for workers that spawned unexpected programs, abnormal worker exits or core dumps, long-lived HTTP/2 connections with heavy ingress and few logged requests, and unusual outbound connections or DNS lookups. A clean access log is not proof of safety, because HTTP/2 control frames are not normally logged as requests. None of these signs is proof on its own. Ask before deleting files or isolating a host. 6. Report back - Versions and packages found, whether HTTP/2, HTTP/3, or mail proxy is on, upgrade or mitigation applied, worker restart confirmed, and anything still on an unfixed build. Do not invent CVEs, package versions, or indicators. If a check needs access I have not given you, say what you need and stop.