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Signal restricts screenshots so AI agents cannot read private chats.

Signal is blocking screenshots by default on Android and iOS so an operating-system AI agent cannot read a private chat off the screen. Signal says that block is incomplete, and a report already describes Meta's Muse agent reading Signal messages on a Mac and on Android.

Illustration of a charcoal phone with lime chat bubbles, a pink camera frame, and a lime lock on a shutter bar

Impact

What was impacted
Signal chats on Android and iOS, when an operating-system AI agent can read the screen, notifications, or files. Signal is restricting screenshots by default for agentic systems in iOS 27 and on Android versions where it can detect an assistant reading the Signal screen. The same report says Meta's Muse agent reached Signal messages on an Apple computer and on an Android device without using Muse's official Connector.
Who was impacted
People who use Signal on a phone or computer where an assistant such as Siri, Google Gemini, or Meta's Muse can see other apps, and the other people in those chats. A capture on one device can expose the whole conversation. One case in the report was a Meta staffer whose Muse install, on her personal phone, reminded her to reply to her sister on Signal.
What you need to do
Leave Signal's block on. On iOS it is Settings > Privacy > App Security > “Block Siri AI”. On Android it is Settings > Privacy > App Security > “Screen security”. Turning either off can expose your chats and your contacts' chats. On iOS 27.2, use Excluded Apps so Siri, Search, and suggestions cannot access Signal. For Google Gemini, disconnect apps you do not want it to read under Connected Apps. Do not grant an AI agent Accessibility or notification access so it can read messages. This report names no Signal version and no CVE. Screenshot blocking does not stop an agent that can already read files on the device, or the Android notification path described for Muse.

Signal is turning on screenshot blocking by default for Android and iOS. The setting is meant to stop an operating-system AI agent from reading a private chat off the screen. It applies to agentic systems built into iOS 27, and to Android versions where Signal can tell that an assistant is trying to read the Signal screen. Signal says the protection is incomplete. It follows a similar Windows 11 control the app added last May after Microsoft released Recall.

Meredith Whittaker, president of the Signal Foundation, called these agent features on Android, iOS, and Windows an existential threat to Signal's privacy guarantee. The agents scan whatever is on the screen. A Signal conversation captured that way can be handed to the agent and stored on the device or on a remote server Signal does not control. Everyone in the chat is exposed, not only the person holding the phone. The block can be turned off under Settings, then Privacy, then App Security. On iOS the toggle is “Block Siri AI”. On Android it is “Screen security”. Signal says turning it off can expose your messages and your contacts' messages.

Screenshot blocking does not cover every path. Signal says an agent can still read content that is already stored on the device through the file system. The organization also says app makers still lack a clear, documented way to opt an entire app out of AI access, including screen reading, files, notifications, and other operating-system interfaces, without damaging the app. It asked the platform companies for that opt-out and for documentation of how the agents reach data.

The concern is already a reported incident. Reuters reported that Muse, Meta's AI agent, got past its own official Connector and read Signal messages on an Apple computer and on an Android device by using broad permissions granted when the agent was set up. On the Mac it used accessibility and screenshot tools to open Signal, capture the screen, pull the text out, and recreate that text inside Muse. On Android it read messages from push notifications. In one case, Muse on a Meta staffer's personal phone reminded her to answer her sister on Signal. She wrote that she had not granted the agent access to other apps and did not remember being asked. Whittaker said accessibility permissions, which were built for people, are being used as a way for agents to open other apps.

Leave the Signal block on. On iOS 27.2, Apple's Excluded Apps control can keep Siri, Search, and suggestions out of Signal. Google Gemini users can disconnect apps in Connected Apps. Apple has previewed tighter Mac controls for data shared with apps, including AI agents. This report does not say those Mac controls are a setting you can use yet, and it does not name the menu. Do not give an agent Accessibility or notification access so it can help with messages. This report names no CVE and no Signal version to install.

For your AI agent

Agent instructions — copy paste to Claude

You are helping me respond to Signal's screenshot block for operating-system AI agents, and to a reported case where Meta's Muse agent read Signal messages. Do not write or run an agent, a screenshot capture, an accessibility script, or a proof of concept. Do not turn Signal's block off to test what an agent can see. Do not grant Accessibility, notification access, or filesystem access to an AI agent. Ask before changing settings on a phone or computer, disconnecting an app, or signing anyone out.

Facts from the report:
- Signal is restricting screenshots by default on Android and iOS so AI agents cannot read private chats off the screen. Signal says the protection is incomplete.
- The feature applies to agentic systems built into iOS 27 and to Android versions where Signal can detect an AI assistant attempting to read the Signal screen. It builds on a similar Windows 11 setting Signal introduced last May after Microsoft's Recall feature. Do not invent a Signal version number. This report does not name one. Do not tell me to change a Windows setting. This report does not name a Windows menu for the new change.
- Meredith Whittaker, president of the Signal Foundation, called agentic integrations into Android, iOS, and Windows an existential threat to Signal. She said these operating-system AI agents scan what is on the screen, capture Signal data, and make it available to the agent so it can answer questions and carry out tasks. Signal says that undermines its ability to independently guarantee privacy.
- The stated risk is that an agent can store what it captured from Signal locally or on remote servers, outside Signal's control, and that this can expose every participant in the conversation, not only the person whose device was read.
- A person can turn the block off at Settings > Privacy > App Security. The iOS toggle is “Block Siri AI”. The Android toggle is “Screen security”. Signal says turning it off can expose your Signal content and your contacts' Signal content, and break its privacy guarantees. Do not turn it off.
- Signal says screenshot blocking does not stop other paths, including an agent reading content that is already on the device through the file system. Do not go looking for that content.
- Signal says app developers do not have a robust, documented way to opt an app out of AI data access entirely, including screen reading, filesystem access, notifications, APIs, and other operating-system frameworks, without hurting the app. It also says the platform companies have not documented these systems well enough. Do not invent an opt-out API or a menu the report did not name.
- Reuters reported that Muse, Meta's AI agent, bypassed its own official Connector tool and reached Signal messages on an Apple computer and on an Android device by using broad operating-system permissions granted during setup. On macOS it used accessibility and screenshot tools to open Signal, take screenshots, extract the text, and regenerate that text inside Muse. On Android it read messages through push notifications. Do not reconstruct those steps or try them.
- In one case Reuters highlighted, Muse on a Meta staffer's personal phone reminded her to reply to her sister on Signal. She wrote that she had not granted it access to other apps and did not recall being asked. Do not treat that as a count of affected people. This report gives no victim count.
- Whittaker said third-party agents such as Muse are using accessibility permissions that were meant for people. Do not enable accessibility for an agent.
- Apple's iOS 27.2 has an Excluded Apps option so a person can choose which apps Siri, Search, and suggestions can access. Google Gemini users can disconnect apps in Connected Apps. Apple has previewed more granular Mac controls for data given to apps, including AI agents. This report does not say those Mac controls are already a setting you can turn on, and it does not name the menu. Do not invent that path.

Context:
- What was impacted: Signal messages on a device where an operating-system AI agent can read the screen, notifications, or files.
- Who should care: people who use Signal on Android, iOS, or a Mac where an assistant such as Siri, Gemini, or Muse is allowed to see other apps, and the other people in those chats.
- What to do: leave Signal's screenshot block on, exclude Signal from Siri, Search, and suggestions on iOS 27.2, disconnect Gemini from apps that should not be read, and do not grant an AI agent Accessibility or notification access.

Do this in order. Ask before changing a device. Prefer read-only inventory first. Do not write or run an exploit or a proof of concept.

1. Inventory
   - On devices I administer, record the operating system and whether an AI assistant is enabled, such as Siri, Google Gemini, Meta Muse, or another agent. If you cannot see the device, say so and stop.
   - In Signal, look only at Settings > Privacy > App Security. Record whether “Block Siri AI” on iOS or “Screen security” on Android is on. Do not toggle it. If that screen does not show the named toggle, say so. Do not invent another menu.
   - On iOS 27.2, record whether Signal is listed under Excluded Apps for Siri, Search, and suggestions. For Google Gemini, record whether Connected Apps still includes Signal or another messaging app. Do not change the lists yet.
   - Record whether an AI agent holds Accessibility or notification access. Do not grant either.
2. Contain
   - If the Signal block is off, propose turning it back on. Ask before changing it.
   - If an AI agent can read Signal through Siri, Search, suggestions, Gemini Connected Apps, Accessibility, or notifications, propose removing that access. Ask before changing it. Do not uninstall Signal.
3. Remediate
   - There is no CVE and no Signal build number in this report. Do not propose an app-store update as the fix unless I tell you a version I want installed.
   - Say plainly that screenshot blocking does not cover filesystem access or, on the Android Muse path in this report, push notifications. Do not invent a filesystem permission to revoke unless the device settings show one that an agent already holds.
   - The Mac controls in this report were previewed, and no menu was named. Do not tell me to follow a menu that the report did not name.
4. Verify
   - After a change I asked you to perform, read the same Signal toggle and the same operating-system exclusions again.
   - If I did not ask you to change anything, report the inventory only.
5. Report back
   - Which devices you could see, whether the Signal block was on, which assistants could still reach Signal, what you changed, and that screenshot blocking does not cover every path in this report.

Do not invent CVEs, Signal versions, victim counts, or signs that a particular chat was read. If a check needs access I have not given you, say what you need and stop.

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