News
A case-open attack can reset Windows Hello and BitLocker PIN lockouts.
Researchers showed that opening some PCs and tampering with the firmware TPM’s saved state lets short Hello and BitLocker PINs be guessed in hours or days.

Impact
- What was impacted
- The wrong-guess counter for Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs on firmware TPMs. That counter is stored encrypted on the mainboard flash chip. On AMD PCs that use RPMC flash, processor firmware (CVE-2026-43613, CVSS 5.1) does not check that the counter actually increased, so a board between the processor and the flash can restore an old count. On Winbond RPMC flash, the researchers say a voltage glitch can leak the key that signs counter values. In the lab, AMD desktops without RPMC accepted an old flash image written back with a normal programmer. Physical access is required. No attacks outside the lab are described.
- Who was impacted
- People and admins who rely on a short numeric Windows Hello PIN or BitLocker startup PIN, especially on AMD Ryzen, Ryzen AI, Threadripper, Athlon, and EPYC PCs, and on machines with Winbond RPMC flash (chips marked 25R or 74M). The researchers expect the AMD firmware flaw to affect PCs that use Microsoft Pluton as the TPM, but they did not show that. Intel said the work did not demonstrate a flaw in an Intel component; the Intel laptop in the test depended on the Winbond chip.
- What you need to do
- Add at least two digits. For Windows Hello for Business, raise Minimum PIN length under Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > PIN Complexity. If that policy is unset, Windows already requires six digits, and an admin can set it as low as four. For BitLocker, raise Configure minimum PIN length for startup (default six, allowed range 4 to 20) and turn on Allow enhanced PINs for startup if you want letters and symbols. Keep PCs physically controlled until a PC-maker firmware update ships. AMD’s own firmware fixes are planned from November 2026 through February 2027 for most listed chips, and those dates are not PC updates. Winbond has not committed to a chip fix.
Researchers at Technische Universität Berlin showed that the lockout meant to stop PIN guessing on a firmware TPM can be reset by someone who opens the case. The TPM in these PCs is built into the processor and keeps its saved state, including the count of wrong guesses, encrypted on the mainboard flash. Copy that state and write the old copy back, and the count returns with it, unless the PC detects the replay.
Newer boards try to catch replays with counters inside the flash chip, called RPMC, that should only increase. On AMD PCs that use those counters, the processor firmware never checks that a counter actually went up. AMD confirmed the flaw as CVE-2026-43613 (CVSS 5.1) and said RPMC is intended to stop this kind of interposer attack, even though physical attacks sit outside its usual threat model. Winbond RPMC chips have a separate problem: a brief power glitch can leak the key that signs counter values. On the Intel laptop the researchers tested, firmware sent the chip the same value at every boot, so the leaked key still worked after a restart. Three Intel systems without this kind of flash did detect a simple write-back.
Both lab PINs were ones the researchers had set, and both fell within 236 guesses. On a locked HP OmniBook 3 with an AMD Ryzen AI 5 330, a four-digit Hello PIN took 57 minutes. Windows restarted the laptop after every five wrong tries, but it did not apply a lockout delay. Microsoft’s documented defaults lock the TPM after 32 failures and forget one failure every 10 minutes. On a Framework Laptop 13 with an Intel Core Ultra 5 125H and Winbond flash, a six-digit BitLocker PIN took 6 minutes and 55 seconds, because each reset restored a fresh set of 32 tries. From those speeds they estimate a worst case of about 40 hours for a four-digit Hello PIN, versus 69 days when the lockout works as documented, and about 20 days for a default six-digit BitLocker PIN, versus 19 years. Two more digits move the Hello worst case to 168 days and an eight-digit PIN into decades. A four-digit BitLocker PIN is possible only if an admin lowers the six-digit minimum, and that case drops to about five hours.
The researchers say either method could be used against either PIN, and that a recovered Hello PIN might also unlock device-tied keys, Hello single sign-on, and in some setups a multi-factor check. They did not demonstrate those claims. They published attack firmware, board designs, and scripts, and say reproducing the RPMC attacks needs their board. Vendor notices do not describe attacks outside the lab. Microsoft, told in April, rated the Hello report moderate, issued no CVE, and said it would raise the recommended minimum Hello PIN to six digits. A Windows 11 test build makes six digits the minimum for personal-account Hello PINs, with an option to keep four, but that test channel may never ship. AMD’s firmware dates run from November 2026 to February 2027 across Ryzen, Ryzen AI, Threadripper, Athlon, and EPYC, with one unnamed product still undated. The bulletin does not cover AMD PCs that lack RPMC flash, and it does not say the update will block installing older firmware, which the researchers say a fix must do. On an AMD PC, a Linux live session can show whether RPMC is present with: grep . /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/*/rpmc_* — missing files do not mean the PC lacks RPMC. Intel owners have no equivalent check; they would have to look for a Winbond chip marked 25R or 74M.
For your AI agent
Agent instructions — copy paste to Claude
You are helping me respond to research from Technische Universität Berlin: someone with physical access can reset the firmware-TPM wrong-guess counter for Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs on some PCs, then guess a short numeric PIN. On AMD systems with RPMC flash this is CVE-2026-43613 (CVSS 5.1): processor firmware does not verify that the flash counter increased. On Winbond RPMC flash, the researchers report a voltage glitch that leaks the counter-signing key. AMD desktops without RPMC in their lab accepted an old flash image written back with a normal programmer. Lab worst cases they calculated: about 40 hours for a 4-digit Hello PIN (versus 69 days with the documented lockout), 168 days for 6-digit Hello, about 20 days for a default 6-digit BitLocker PIN (versus 19 years), and about 5 hours for a 4-digit BitLocker PIN if an admin lowered the minimum. No attacks outside the lab are described. AMD firmware fixes are planned from November 2026 through February 2027 for most Ryzen, Ryzen AI, Threadripper, Athlon, and EPYC chips; those dates are for AMD firmware, not updates already shipping from PC makers. Winbond has not committed to a chip fix. Intel said the research did not show a flaw in an Intel component. Context: - What was impacted: the TPM lockout count stored on mainboard flash for Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs. - Who should care: AMD PCs and PCs with Winbond RPMC flash (markings 25R or 74M), especially where Hello or BitLocker PINs are short. Pluton-as-TPM is expected to be affected on AMD but was not demonstrated. - What to do: lengthen PINs by at least two digits, allow enhanced BitLocker PINs where practical, keep machines physically controlled, and install the PC maker’s firmware when it exists. Do this in order. Ask before changing PIN policy, BitLocker settings, or firmware. Prefer read-only checks. Do not attempt the hardware attack, voltage glitches, flash rewriting, or PIN guessing. 1. Inventory - Record Windows Hello for Business Minimum PIN length (Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > PIN Complexity). If it is unset, Windows requires six digits; an admin can set it as low as four. - Record BitLocker “Configure minimum PIN length for startup” (default six, range 4 to 20) and whether “Allow enhanced PINs for startup” is on. - Note which PCs are AMD and which may use Winbond RPMC flash. On an AMD PC, a Linux live USB can run: grep . /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/*/rpmc_* Missing files do not prove RPMC is absent. 2. Contain - Treat short-PIN laptops that leave a controlled space as higher risk until the PIN is longer or firmware is updated. - Ask before changing who can open cases or before pulling machines from use. 3. Remediate - Propose raising Hello and BitLocker minimum PIN length by at least two digits. Prefer eight where the researchers’ table puts worst-case guessing into years. Ask before enforcing it, because users will need to change PINs. - Plan to install AMD’s CVE-2026-43613 firmware once the PC maker ships it. Do not assume a November 2026 to February 2027 AMD date means a BIOS update is available now. - For Winbond RPMC machines, ask the PC maker about updates. There is no committed chip fix in the reporting. 4. Verify - After a policy change, confirm the effective minimum on a sample of devices. After a firmware update, record the BIOS version. 5. Report back - Current PIN minimums, how many devices are AMD or suspected Winbond, physical-control gaps, and whether a vendor BIOS exists yet. Do not invent BIOS versions or claim a PC is safe because it is Intel. If a check needs access I have not given you, say what you need and stop.